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Abstract—An exam is a practise for assessing the knowl-
edge of a candidate from an examination she takes. Exams
are used in various contexts, such as in university tests and
public competitions. We begin by identifying various security and
privacy requirements that modern exams should meet, especially
in the prospect of them being supported by information and
communication technologies. These requirements extend well
beyond ensuring authenticating the candidate and preventing her
from cheating. Cheating is routinely enforced by invigilation by
trusted parties, whereas we discuss that an exam should meet
its security and privacy requirements against stronger threat
models, including malicious exam authorities. Thus exams must
be designed with the care normally devoted to security protocols,
and in such a mindset we present WATA IV, a new protocol that
meets our security and privacy requirements even when an exam
manager is malicious.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cambridge Dictionaries Online defines an exam as a test
of a student’s knowledge or skill in a particular subject that
results in a qualification if the student is successful. The use
of exams in meritocratic societies is widespread, with various
examples derivable from the education sector (admissions,
courseworks and final qualifications) as well as from the work
sector (recruitment and progression).
This paper draws its main motivation from the observation
that exams raise security and privacy issues that are more
challenging than one may think at first. This is due to at least
two main reasons. One is that, while threats are traditionally
ascribed to candidates and normally mitigated by invigilation,
they may as well come from the authorities running the exams.
They also may be corrupted to various extents and can, for
example, tamper with the tests or alter the marks. Therefore,
exams begin to look more balanced in terms of threats or
benefits their participants pose or seek. The other reason is that,
to increase the security and privacy challenges, it also comes
the use of computers. Although the use of information and
communication technology simplifies certain tasks occurring
during an exam, such as shuffling the questions to put in the
tests or recording the marks for the candidates, it generally
makes an exam more vulnerable. The traditional strategies
to detect and reduce cheating, unless re-designed, may be
incapable against digital threats, and the adoption of the new
technology must come with new requirements. When overall
met, they should ensure at least the same level of security
and privacy that paper-and-pencil exams have enjoyed so far.
Hence, we shall unfold the argument that an exam must be
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designed and analysed as carefully as security systems and
protocols normally are.
Contribution. It is at least double. It begins with the definition
of thirteen security and privacy requirements for exam proto-
cols. The list is foundational by containing the requirements
that we deem necessary out of our experience in both running
academic examinations and performing security analysis; but,
it can be expected that specific exams may demand variations
to some requirements or additional ones. In particular, the list
includes anonymous marking, which safeguards the candidate
by stating that her test is anonymous while it is marked. As
shall we see, this requirement has been raising interests in the
last decade (see §VII).
The second contribution is the computer-assisted exam
protocol WATA IV and its informal security analysis. It is the
latest in a family of protocols which were incepted back in
2004, with prototypes used at the final exam of the Computer
Security module at the University of Catania [1]. Differently
its predecessors, WATA IV meets all the thirteen requirements
herein identified, and provides a less provincial solution, easily
adaptable to different university exam processes. Besides it is
robust against a stronger threat model, this including a ma-
licious observer, malicious candidates, an honest-but-curious
anonymiser with lightweight participation, and a malicious
manager with intensive participation. Such a threat model is
realistic in most real situations, even though more malicious
situations of theoretical interest can be envisaged.
Outline. After a preliminary and general description of the
structure of an exam (§II), this paper identifies the security and
privacy requirements (§III), and then gives the threat model and
assumptions (§IV) on which WATA IV rests (§V). It continues
with the informal analysis of the protocol (§VI), the relevant
related work (§VII) and some conclusions (§VIII).
II. PORTRAIT OF AN EXAM
Typically, an exam consists of at least four phases: registra-
tion, which includes preparatory works such as anonymization
of the tests; testing, which sees candidates take the test;
marking, when the tests are evaluated; notification, when the
candidates are notified of their marks.
WATA IV, as explained in §V, is designed to allow the
candidate to register for the exam and be notified of her mark at
home, while testing takes place traditionally, with the candidate
visiting the exam venue.
If a role is a set of principals who perform a set of
tasks, a typical exam, and WATA IV in particular, insists on
the following roles: the candidate role, of undertaking the
exam; the anonymiser role, of generating the pseudonyms and
delivering them at registration; the manager role, of handling
registration and notification; the invigilator, of distributing the
tests, supervising the candidates at testing, and gathering the
tests; the examiner role, of marking the tests. Roles and their
participation at the different exam phases are resumed in the
following table.
registration testing marking notification
candidate × × ×
manager × ×
invigilator ×
anonymiser ×
examiner ×
These roles can be taken by various principals, depending
on the usage scenarios. At University, the candidate role is
played by students, and the examiner and the invigilator role
by lecturers; the manager could be any faculty officer, and the
anonymiser a third-party service, such as an administrative or
secretary office.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
We identify a number of requirements for exams, which
we organized in three lists: authentication, privacy, and other
requirements this including secrecy, integrity and verifiability.
While we find them highly desirable out of personal experience
and discussions with colleagues, the list is not meant to be
universal or exhaustive. Certain exams may demand variations,
others may demand additional requirements.
Authentication: We identify six authentication require-
ments pertaining to the candidate, her test, the questions and
answers on her test, the mark given to the test, and the notifier.
A1 Candidate eligibility: if a candidate’s identity is en-
tered in the list of candidates registered for an exam,
then she passes the official eligibility criteria for the
exam. This requirement insists that only specific
candidates can successfully register for that exam.
A2 Candidate authentication: if a candidate is admitted
to testing, then she is is correctly associated with her
identity. This is a rather standard requirement stating
that candidates really are who they claim to be.
A3 Candidate authorisation: if a candidate is admitted to
testing, then she is correctly associated with an entry
in the list of candidates registered for that exam.
A4 Test authentication: if a candidate receives a test from
an invigilator, then she is admitted to testing, and the
test is correctly associated with the candidate identity
This says that a test must be bound to a candidate
identity from the moment she receives the test. It also
implies that two candidates will be unable to get tested
on each other’s questions.
We observe the common way to enforce A4 is to assign a
test to a candidate only after the candidate inserts in the test
the same details that authenticated her. This candidate becomes
the test assignee. With exams that are not computer assisted,
for example, an authority can check that the candidate writes
down the right details on the test sheet, or the authority can
write them down personally.
A5 Answer authentication: if a candidate inserts answers
in a test, then she received that test from an invigilator.
This prescribes that a candidate cannot receive a test
through cheating and so answer the test of another
candidate’s, namely a test authenticated by someone
else. It prevents candidates to swap their tests when
these are already authenticated, ruling out collusion
scenarios whereby a knowledgeable candidate agrees
to take the test on behalf of a less knowledgeable one,
perhaps under compensation.
A6 Notification request authentication: if the notifier re-
ceives a request to attribute a mark to a candidate,
then the request is correctly associated with the candi-
date. It means that the candidate is the only principal
who can decide that she wants to be notified with
her mark, and no-one else can do that on her behalf.
This is important in scenarios where a candidate is
allowed to decide whether to be notified of her mark or
not, which interesting pedagogical implications. The
candidate might opt not to be notified, for example,
having self-assessed her work after testing with an
insufficient outcome. Some universities have rules that
limits the number of failures during the academic year
or force students failing an exam to skip the next exam
session. This is also to discourage students who try the
exam out without adequate preparation.
It can be observed that the postcondition of certain re-
quirements confirms the precondition of others, producing
combined requirements. In particular, the requirement answer
authentication then test authentication then candidate authen-
tication states that if a candidate inserts answers in a test,
then she is correctly associated with her identity, and the
requirement answer authentication then test authentication
then candidate authorisation then candidate eligibility states
that if a candidate inserts answers in a test, then she passes
the official eligibility criteria for the exam. Of course, these
can be shortened yielding other combined requirements.
Privacy: We identify four privacy requirements pertaining
to the test, the mark and the examiner.
P1 Anonymous marking: The examiner cannot associate a
test to its assignee until after he marks (the answer of)
the test. This signifies that the examiner marks a test
while ignoring its author: the test is anonymous. It is
a clear contribution to the fairness of the marking. As
it stands, the requirement insists on anonymity only
till the point that the examiner affixes a mark;
P2 General anonymous marking: No one can associate
a test to its assignee until after the examiner marks
(the answer of) the test. This version of anonymous
marking generalises the previous one by saying that
nobody knows who submitted a test while this is being
marked, except the author of the test. An implication
is that test anonymity during marking will even resist
collusion of the examiner with other authorities.
P3 Anonymous examiner: The candidate cannot learn the
identity of the examiner who marks (the answers of)
her test. Of course, this requirement can be met only
when multiple principals play the examiner role. In
particular, it ensures that the test assignee could not
try, after the testing but before the examiner in fact
marks the test, to coerce or bribe the examiner.
P4 Mark privacy: if the notifier attributes a mark to a
candidate, then this is only revealed to the candidate.
The requirement states that the mark ultimately at-
tributed to a candidate is treated as valuable personal
information of the candidate’s. It is then up to her to
reveal it.
Other requirements: We identify further three requirements
of secrecy, integrity and verifiability.
O1 Question secrecy: the candidate learns the questions
on which she will be marked precisely when a test is
authenticated, and not before. This requirement covers
both the traditional scenario of questions being kept
secret till testing, and that of (typically a high number
of) questions being published before testing without
indication of which candidate gets which questions at
testing. This is a form of temporal secrecy, because it
is relaxed when the test begins.
O2 Test integrity: if a candidate submits a test, then no-
one modifies it. This ensures that each test is passed
on to examiners and marked precisely in the form it is
submitted, with no modification applicable by anyone
to any of its contents, including the questions and the
answers.
O3 Mark verifiability: if the notifier attributes a mark to
a candidate, then the candidate can verify that it is
the same mark that the examiner gave to the test
authenticated by the candidate. This requirement gives
the candidate a sanity check to verify that her mark
is correctly attributed. Meeting this in conjunction
with anonymous marking would give the candidate a
desirable guarantee that the exam has been run fairly.
IV. WATA IV: THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
The design of WATA IV and its security analysis have been
conceived to stand against a specific threat model. This has
been set to be as realistic as possible. “Realistic” means that the
way in which the attacker threatens the exam should be con-
sistent with situations that one likely expects in a real setting,
for example at university exams. A more sophisticated model
of attacker with stronger abilities is possible, but considered
as future work (see §VI-C).
Threat model
All principals who take the various roles are assumed to
be rational in the sense that they will not deviate from the
protocol unless there is a clear advantage for themselves, in
case of collusion, for them and their accomplices. That said,
any role can try to achieve malicious goals, and precisely:
Candidates may try to be overmarked, but their interest in
colluding depends on the exam scenario. If the purpose of the
exam is just to assess their skills, such as with a University
exam, a (malicious) candidate is reasonably more inclined to
collude with other (malicious) candidates because there may
be benefit for all of them. If the exam turns in a competition,
such as an admission exam, a (malicious) candidate may not
want to collude with others.
Anonymiser is honest-but-curious, hence it is simply inter-
ested in collecting the data. Note that the anonymiser is only
active at registration, and its being curious captures sufficiently
what may happen in real scenarios. There is no real interest
in a more active and disruptive maliciousness. For instance,
in university exams, the role of anonymiser is often left to
administrative or faculty offices. Behaving more maliciously
than being curious may trigger controls, which is something
that such offices do not want as this is going against their
own interests. They are not only accountable for the easy
execution of the exam, but any problem will increase their
own workload for instance as it happens when the exam has
to be repeated. We can see some level of accountability also
in public tenders, where third parties can be entitled to be
anonymisers. Again, they can be tempted to harvest data for
future benefit, but not to play actively against the rules with the
risk of compromising their own reputation. Considering more
aggressive anonymisers is interesting but out of scope in this
paper, and such a study is left for future work (see §VI-C).
Manager and invigilator are malicious in the traditional
sense, as they can also perform active attacks. We assume that
candidates are invigilated so we exclude forms of collusion
between invigilator and candidate roles. However, we observe
that such collusion would require a diffuse level of corruption,
usually mitigated by admitting many independent invigilators.
In addition to the roles seen above, it is useful to define the
observer role. This can be seen as a general attacker who does
not fit into a canonical exam role. For example, he can watch
(parts of) the exam and try to intercept pieces of information.
He can harvest private information such as the mark that the
examiner ultimately assigns to a candidate, or favour certain
candidates. An observer can be an outsider, or a student who is
sitting at the exam but only to learn by heart the exam process
and the questions for future cheating, a real and serious threat
known as brain dump.
In particular, WATA IV has been blueprinted to resist the
following attacks.
• The candidate getting a higher mark than her test
answers deserve. This is the most common threat that
may come by whoever takes an exam.
• The honest-but-curious anonymiser. The anonymiser,
which can be played by an internal office or an
external service provider such as Google or Microsoft,
is curious as it tries to harvest more information than
it needs to run its business.
• The examiner assigning an unfair mark to a specific
candidate. Prejudice and discrimination can bias the
evaluation of a test. By learning the author of the test,
the examiner may assign a lower or higher mark than
the test deserves.
• The manager tampering with the marks. The manager
wants to notify a candidate with a different mark from
the one the examiner assigned to the candidate’s test.
This is what happened, for instance, in the Atlanta scandal1,
where teachers and principals changed the marks of all students
driven by the illegal objective to increase the ranking of the
schools and get more public funds.
• The manager colluding with the examiner. The man-
ager may become more effective by colluding with the
examiner.
This attack is a refinement of the previous attack. In the Atlanta
scandal we have just reported, all authorities colluded to realize
the change of the marks.
• The observer getting candidates’ private information.
If he manages to get the marks of various candidates
for coercion or trade.
• The observer tampering with test answers and marks.
For example, an observer wants to downgrade the
mark of a candidate to favour another candidate.
Assumptions
We work with a few assumptions.
• Each candidate has an email address to which prin-
cipals can send private messages. We assume that
attackers are out of control of the email infrastructure.
This means that attacker does not manage the mail
account of the candidate.
• The questions are transmitted securely to the invig-
ilator prior to testing or a very large number of
them are made public. According the exam rules, each
test contains one or more questions generated by a
question committee. This means that questions are
either unknown to a candidate who receives them at
testing, or potentially known among a very large set of
questions perhaps even before the candidate registers
for the exam.
• A number of principals take the examiner role. This
number should be sufficiently high to make the prob-
ability of guessing which examiner marks a specific
test as low as the application scenario requires.
• A number of principals take the candidate role. This
number should be sufficiently high to make the prob-
ability of guessing the candidate upon whom a test
is authenticated as low as the application scenario
requires.
V. WATA IV: PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we first sketch and explain the crypto
primitives and the security features that WATA IV adopts, and
then present a description of the protocol.
Visual Cryptography: It is a secret sharing scheme
devised by Naor and Shamir [2] that allows the human
visual system to decrypt a ciphertext split into a number of
transparency sheets. The basic version of the scheme is a 2-
out-of-2 secret sharing system, where a secret image is split
into two images (shares) shareA and shareB which are then
1e.g., see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta Public Schools cheating scandal
Fig. 1. The candidate paper sheet
printed on transparency sheets. Overlaying the transparency
sheets reveals the secret image. The basic scheme is perfectly
secure because each share leaks no information about the secret
image. In short, the scheme emulates the XOR operation by
mapping each pixel of shareA and shareB into a block of
2×2 sub-pixels. Shares shareA and shareB are thus generated
so that the result of their overlap is the secret image, whose
contrast is reduced by half.
QR signature: It generates a QR code that contains
a plaintext and its corresponding cryptographic signature.
The QR code is a two-dimensional label that facilitates the
recognition of data to optical readers. QR codes can store more
data in a less space compared to mono-dimensional barcodes.
Moreover, they have a customizable level of error correction
capability, and can be read from any perspective. Note that
the QR code is not a cryptographic primitive: it is a way to
represent data. It is worth to mention that QR codes encoding
signatures have been already adopted in voting, and precisely
by the Preˆt a` Voter voting system that uses them to enclose the
voter choices without including the plaintext [3]. But a self-
contained QR signature is more usable for WATA IV, where
the plaintext also includes the visual crypto image share.
Commitment Scheme: It is a solution to bind a value
to the committer while hiding the value to others. The scheme
has two phases: the commitment phase, in which the value
is chosen, hidden, and bound to the committer, and the
disclosure phase, in which the value is publicly revealed.
The Pedersen commitment scheme [4] ensures unconditional
hiding, that is, even an unbounded attacker cannot figure out
the hidden value. In a nutshell, the Pedersen scheme works
as follows. The commitment phase assumes two given public
generators g, h ∈ Gq. The committer chooses the value v and a
random commitment parameter r ∈R Z
∗
q . The committer then
publishes the commitment c = gvhr. At the disclosure phase,
the committer reveals v and r, thus anyone can verify the com-
mitment. WATA IV adopts the Pedersen commitment scheme
during notification. The manager generates a commitment of
the candidate’s mark. If a candidate decides to be notified and
thus reveals her identity to the manager, she can verify that
the notified mark is the mark committed by the manager.
The table outlined below resumes the application of the
cryptographic primitives according the four phases of an exam.
registration testing marking notification
Visual Crypto × × ×
QR signature × ×
Commitment × ×
A. Protocol Specification
We describe WATA IV through the four exam phases.
Figure 3 gives it in form of a message sequence chart.
Registration: The manager creates a new exam identifier,
the unique alphanumeric string ex . A candidate who wants
to register for the exam uses a private channel to send her
personal details (i.e., name, surname, enrolment number and
email address) to the manager. We stress that connections to
the manager and anonymiser must be through secure channels.
The manager checks whether the candidate is eligible for the
exam and, if so, enters the candidate details in a dedicated
list. After that, the manager forwards the candidate’s details
and the exam code to the anonymiser.
The anonymiser generates a token that consists of a
random alphanumeric string, and a random visual crypto
image, shareA. Then, the anonymiser generates the second
visual crypto image, shareB , such that overlapping shareA
and shareB results in the image representing of the token,
tokenAB . Let dataA denote the triple formed by the candi-
date’s details, ex and shareA. The anonymiser signs dataA,
generates the corresponding QR signature as follows. First,
the plaintext dataA is encoded in Base64 and signed with
the signing key of the anonymiser. Then, the signature is also
represented in Base64, and included in the final QR code
with the corresponding encoded plaintext. The anonymiser
includes such information in a digital version of an A4 paper
sheet paperA (Figure 1) to facilitate the printing. The QR
signatures printed on the bottom of the sheets self contain the
data reported on each sheet and its corresponding signature.
The anonymiser sends the signed dataA, and paperA to the
manager. Similarly, the anonymiser generates paperB and the
signed dataB , which include shareB rather than shareA.
Then, the anonymiser sends the signed dataB and paperB
to the candidate.
For each candidate, the manager stores her corresponding
signed dataA into the database, and prints each paperA on a
transparency sheet. Similarly, each candidate prints her paperB
on a common paper sheet, and the registration concludes.
Testing: The manager hands the list of registered candi-
dates, the transparency sheets, and the tests to the invigilator,
who brings them at the exam venue. Each candidate takes a
seat, and hands a valid identity document to the invigilator
for authentication. The invigilator also checks that each can-
didate is in the list of those registered for the exam. Then,
the invigilator finds the transparency sheet that reports the
candidate’s details, and hands her the transparency sheet along
with a test. If some registered candidates fail to show up,
some transparency sheets may be undelivered. In that case,
the invigilator puts the corresponding transparency sheets and
the excess tests aside.
Once the invigilator delivers transparency sheets to all
candidates, each candidate can overlay her paper sheet with
the corresponding transparency sheet and read the token. The
candidate writes down her token in the test sheet and begin to
answer the questions. When the testing time is over, the can-
didate submits her test, and takes the paper and transparency
sheets back with her. The candidate can place her test anywhere
in the pile of already submitted tests, and this behaves as an
anonymous channel. The invigilator collects the pile of tests
when all candidates have submitted their tests.
Marking: The invigilator hands all the tests (even the
excess) and the remaining transparency sheets to the manager,
who, in turn, forwards the filled tests to the examiners. Each
examiner chooses a random pile of tests and evaluates all test
answers in it, assigns a mark to each test, hence to the token
found on the test. The examiner then signs each triple formed
by test, token, and mark, and finally sends all such triples to the
manager. The latter verifies the signatures and stores the triples
in the database. Then, the manager generates a commitment of
the each mark, signs each pair of token and mark commitment,
and publishes them on a public append-only bulletin board [5].
This allows each candidate to verify whether her test answers
were marked while she still ignores how.
Notification: The manager runs the notification for a fixed
time frame. The candidate who wants to know her mark sends
the signed dataB to the manager via a secure channel. The
manager verifies the signature, and overlaps shareB with each
shareA into the database until it finds an intelligible token.
Notably, this procedure can be implemented, hence require
no human involvement. The manager thus retrieves the mark
associated with the token from the database, signs them with
the corresponding commitment parameter, and sends them to
the candidate.
VI. WATA IV: SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the given threat model (§IV) our protocol meets all
security requirements seen in Section III, as discussed below.
Authentication
Candidate eligibility (A1) is met because during registra-
tion the manager checks that each candidate who wants to
register satisfies the relevant criteria.
Candidate authentication (A2) is met because the invigi-
lator checks the identity document of each candidate before
admitting her to testing.
Candidate authorisation (A3) is met because the invigilator
checks that the identity of each candidate also is in the list
of those registered for the exam before the candidate can be
admitted to testing.
Test authentication (A4) is met because the invigilator
admits a candidate to testing before giving her the transparency
sheet that has her name. If a malicious candidate prints a
different visual crypto image on her paper sheet, she could
then read no intelligible token by overlapping the paper sheet
with the transparency sheet. The same applies if any two
malicious candidates swap their paper sheets before testing. As
we shall see later, a dispute resolution procedure guarantees
that a malicious candidate cannot even claim that no token
appears because the manager misprinted the corresponding
transparency sheet. Still, a malicious candidate could write a
random token on the test, but then at notification the candidate
would be unable to send a valid signature of the token and her
details (dataB).
Answer authentication (A5) is met because the invigilator
supervises all through testing, so malicious candidates are
unable to swap their tests. However, we are not protected by
invigilators that collude with the students, as in the fraud that
has been documented by the BBC.2 In WATA IV we ruled out
this attack by assuming independent invigilators to reduce the
likelihood of collusions.
Notification request authentication (A6) is met because
only the candidate holds her shareB .
Privacy
Anonymous marking (P1) is met because the examiner
cannot associate a test with a candidate while he is marking
it. General anonymous marking (P2) is met too because the
manager cannot do that either. Notably, this is the case even
if the examiner, the manager, and the invigilator collude, and
even after the marking — should a candidate chooses not to
get her grade.
Anonymous examiner (P3) is met because an adequate
number of principals play the examiner role, and each ran-
domly picks the tests that he will mark. Moreover, the exam-
iner’s identity is not revealed to the candidate even after she
is notified with the mark.
Mark privacy (P4) is met because the manager notifies the
mark to a candidate only if the latter sends a valid shareB , and
thus each candidate can get only their corresponding mark. Our
protocol also guarantees mark privacy against examiners, man-
ager, and invigilator who collude; in fact, they are oblivious
to the correct shareB . Also, the anonymiser cannot associate
a candidate with a mark, because the manager only publishes
the commitment of the mark on the bulletin board.
Other requirements
Question secrecy (O1) is met by the assumptions on the
origin of tests (§IV) in which the question committee generates
the tests.
Test integrity (O2) is met because the invigilator takes a pile
of anonymous tests and passes them on to the manager, who in
turn hands them to the examiner. None of these principals can
benefit from altering the tests, hence they refrain from doing
it because they are rational. As we shall see below, in support
of this analysis comes the fact that the protocol also meets
anonymous marking, consequently mitigating the examiners’
interest in tampering with the tests.
Mark verifiability (O3) is met because the candidates can
verify the examiner signature when the manager notifies their
2see ”Student visa system fraud exposed in BBC investigation” at
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26024375.
marks. The protocol meets this requirement even if the man-
ager and the invigilator collude with the examiners, because
the manager publicly commits to the marks before being able
to associate them with the candidates’ identities.
A. Dispute resolution
A notable feature of WATA IV is the support for dis-
pute resolution during testing. In fact, the combination of
QR signatures and visual cryptography guarantees an easy
procedure to find the culprit if the candidate or the manager
misbehave. Such a dispute originates if no intelligible token
can be read when the candidate overlaps the paper sheet
with the transparency sheet. Should such a dispute arise, the
invigilator could then quickly resolve it as follows. He can
easily scan the QR code printed on the candidate’s paper
sheet and check the correctness of the QR signature. Then,
he checks if the candidate details revealed by the QR code
match the ones written on the candidate’s paper sheet. If so,
the invigilator overlaps the visual crypto image unveiled by the
QR code with the transparency sheet provided by the manager.
If this reveals no intelligible token then the manager misprinted
the corresponding transparency sheet, otherwise the candidate
misprinted her visual crypto image. The outcome of the dispute
can be double checked by repeating the procedure with the QR
code printed on the transparency sheet.
B. Comparison with predecessor
WATA IV brings along significant security improvements
compared to its predecessor WATA III [1]. In particular it is
augmented with Mark privacy, Mark verifiability, and General
anonymous marking. Moreover, (a) WATA IV meets the secu-
rity requirements despite a more realistic threat model that sees
the manager being actively malicious, and not only honest-
but-curious as in WATA III; (b) the candidate receives her
visual crypto image directly rather than indirectly through the
manager at the exam venue, as instead she does in WATA III.
This change impedes that the manager records the candidate’s
share; (c) the candidate can record the manager’s transparency
sheet without raising threats. This is possible because tokens
are signed, hence cannot be forged to associate a test answer to
a candidate other than its author; (d) anyone, even a malicious
manager, can register the mark after the notification thanks
to Mark Verifiability; (e) any dispute between the candidate
and the manager can be solved with no efforts at testing: the
candidate makes sure she received a valid transparency sheet
if an intelligible token appears. If no token appears, the QR
signatures on the sheets reveal who misbehaved.
C. Extension
WATA IV assumes an honest-but-curious anonymiser, a
choice which we motivated in (§IV). However, were one
interested to discuss an anonymiser that acts maliciously and
not only curiously, WATA IV can be extended to preserve
its security properties even under this stronger threat model.
We envisage such extension by using a 1-out-of-N oblivious
transfer protocol (e.g., see [6]), and perhaps an oblivious
printing of the shares as suggested in [7]. Therefore, the
candidate and the manager jointly generate their shares at
registration: neither the candidate nor the manager know each
other shares, but still they have guarantees to hold the correct
ones. The details of this extension are left for future work.
VII. RELATED WORK
The topic of secure electronic exam is only recently at-
tracting the attention of the scientific community. There are
still a limited numbers of works addressing this topic, some
of them indirectly. Foley et al. [8] describes confidentiality
requirements for Computer Supported Collaborative Working
(CSCW). They advance exams as a case study but not to the
point to provide a design of a protocol. Other papers study
the security requirements for e-learning systems [9], [10].
They focus on authentication and privacy issues of teachers
and students, and sketch some ideas towards security [11].
However, while these works focus on external threats, this
paper has shown that exams have to cope with various forms
of insider threats, such as cheating candidates or corrupt
examiners.
Some popular exam systems are adopted in university tests.
In INFOSAFE [12] candidates write their personal details on
top of a tamper-evident paper, hide them with a flap which
is bent and glued over, flap that is tore off after the marking.
NEMO-SCAN [13] uses a patented anonymity paper cover
that hides the candidate details, which are written aside, while
leaving free a section where examiners can mark. The part with
the candidate’s details is scanned using a proprietary device,
which reveals the candidate and assigns her the mark. Other
universities, such as Dublin City University and the University
of Sheffield, use their own exam systems [14], [15]. However,
all such solution assume a trusted manager, contrarily to WATA
IV, to achieve anonymous marking, and it remains unclear
whether they could scale up to other security properties.
Huszti et al. [16] propose an Internet based exam without
trusted third parties, but with an honest role, the Registry. The
protocol aims at a small number of security requirements. Ara-
pinis et al. [17] propose a cloud-based conference management
system that guarantees secrecy and privacy properties. Their
work addresses threats from a malicious cloud by means of
an honest manager. Other works focus on countermeasures to
avoid plagiarism during on-line exams [18], [19], [20], and
advance methods to ensure the authentication of the candidates
[21], [22]: they assume trusted managers and ignore privacy
properties such as anonymous marking.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Exam security has a major role on the widespread accep-
tance of computer assisted protocols for exam competitions.
This paper first has identified thirteen foundational security
and privacy requirements for exams. Then, it has described
WATA IV, an exam protocol that allows remote registration
and notification (e.g., at home), but which requires the exam
to be taken in situ. WATA IV provides the same functional
requirements of traditional exams while guaranteeing a number
of security properties in a realistic threat model. Its informal
analysis confirms that the protocol meets all thirteen require-
ments. The next step is to analyse WATA IV formally and
to investigate how to counter further threats. For example,
how to avoid or detect candidate cheating during testing is an
interesting topic for a future research after the recent system
fraud scandals. We envisage that solutions such as data mining
used to derive patterns [23] can be adopted on top of WATA
IV to even detect plagiarism threats.
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Fig. 2. WATA IV: the message sequence chart
